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Abstract—Compressive sensing (CS) has been widely studied
and applied in many fields. Recently, the way to perform secure
compressive sensing (SCS) has become a topic of growing interest.
The existing works on SCS usually take the sensing matrix as
a key and the resultant security level is not evaluated in depth.
They can only be considered as a preliminary exploration on SCS,
but a concrete and operable encipher model is not given yet. In
this paper, we are going to investigate SCS in a systematic way.
The relationship between CS and symmetric-key cipher indicates
some possible encryption models. To this end, we propose the two-
level protection models (TLPM) for SCS which are developed
from measurements taking and “something else”, respectively. It
is believed that these models will provide a new point of view
and stimulate further research in both CS and cryptography.
Specifically, an efficient and secure encryption scheme for parallel
compressive sensing (PCS) is designed by embedding a two-layer
protection in PCS using chaos. The first layer is undertaken
by random permutation on a two-dimensional signal, which
is proved to be an acceptable permutation with overwhelming
probability. The other layer is to sample the permuted signal
column by column with the same chaotic measurement matrix,
which satisfies the restricted isometry property of PCS with
overwhelming probability. Both the random permutation and
the measurement matrix are constructed under the control of
a chaotic system. Simulation results show that unlike the general
joint compression and encryption schemes in which encryption
always leads to the same or a lower compression ratio, the
proposed approach of embedding encryption in PCS actually
improves the compression performance. Besides, the proposed
approach possesses high transmission robustness against additive
Gaussian white noise and cropping attack.
Index Terms—Secure compressive sensing, two-level protection
models, symmetric-key cipher, parallel compressive sensing, ran-
dom permutation, chaotic measurement matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Existing Work on Joint Compression and Encryption
IN digital signal processing, Shannon/Nyquist samplingtheory is considered as the keystone in signal acquisition
and reconstruction. It governs the sampling process from
the perspective of signal band limitedness. Traditionally, the
sampled data are first compressed and then encrypted, if
necessary. There is an increasing research interest on joint
compression and encryption [1–10] mostly by leveraging
chaos theory and source coding schemes including arithmetic
Manuscript received Mar. 23, 2014. This work was supported by the Natural
Science Foundation Project of CQ CSTC under Grant 2011jjjq40001.
Y. Zhang, D. Xiao and M. Li are with the College of Computer Sci-
ence, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400044 China (e-mail: yushu-
boshi@163.com; xiaodi cqu@hotmail.com; liming629@gmail.com)
K. Wong and L. Zhang are with the Department of Electronic Engi-
neering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong (e-mail:
itkwwong@cityu.edu.hk; leocityu@gmail.com)
coding and Huffman coding. Wu and Kuo [1] suggested
two approaches for integrating encryption with multimedia
compression systems, i.e., selective encryption and modified
entropy coders with multiple statistical models. Both could
be applied to the Huffman and the QM coders. Grangetto et
al. [2] introduced a randomized arithmetic coding paradigm
which provides secrecy by introducing randomization in the
coding process. Wen et al. [3] described an interval splitting
arithmetic coding in which a key known to both encoder and
decoder is used to determine where the intervals are split prior
to encoding each symbol. As a result, the traditional approach
of using a single contiguous interval to encode a source symbol
is relaxed. Kim et al. [4] further analyzed the security of
interval splitting arithmetic coding against chosen-plaintext
attack and added a series of permutations at the input and
output of the encoder. Furthermore, chaos has been employed
in arithmetic coding for encryption purpose [5, 6]. Bose and
Pathak [5] presented a chaos-based adaptive arithmetic coding-
encryption system. Unfortunately, this system has been found
not decodable, since the current symbol to be encoded is
swapped with a randomly selected symbol in the model prior
to encoding, making it impossible for the decoder to mirror
the encoder’s operations [11]. Observing that iterating a skew
tent map reversely is equivalent to arithmetic coding, Wong et
al. [6] proposed a simultaneous compression and encryption
scheme in which the chaotic map for arithmetic coding is
controlled by a secret key and keeps changing.
The aforementioned schemes are basically compression-
orientated by embedding encryption in a compression algo-
rithm. There are also a few reports like [7, 8] on encryption-
orientated schemes. Wong et al. [7] designed an algorithm
for embedding compression in the Baptista-type chaotic cryp-
tosystem and Chen et al. [8] further improved its compression
performance. Besides, there exist some chaos-based compres-
sion and encryption schemes aiming at multimedia data such
as image [9] or video [10]. These works are based on the
traditional Shannon/Nyquist sampling theory. However, for a
new sampling theory referred to as compressed sensing or
compressive sampling (CS), it is worth to investigate how joint
compression and encryption can be achieved. In other words,
the topic to be investigated in this paper is how secrecy can
be incorporated in CS theory.
Making use of the sparseness of natural signals, CS [12–
15] unifies sampling and compression to reduce the data
acquisition and computational load at the encoder, at the cost
of a higher computational complexity at the decoder. If the CS
framework can integrate with certain cryptographic features
for simultaneous sampling, compression and encryption, its
application areas can be extended to, for example, limited-
2resource sensor and video surveillance. It has been suggested
in [15] that CS framework leads to an encryption scheme,
where the sensing matrix can be considered as an encryption
key. In recent years, there exist some pioneer works on
secure compressive sensing (SCS) [16–20]. Rachlin and Baron
[16] found that CS cannot achieve perfect secrecy but can
guarantee computational secrecy. The definition of perfect
secrecy [21] requires that the occurrence probability of a
message conditioned on the cryptogram is equal to the a priori
probability of the message, P (X = x|Y = y) = P (X = x).
Alternatively, the mutual information satisfies I(X ;Y ) = 0.
In contrast to perfect secrecy, computational secrecy relies
on the difficulty in solving a hard computational problem
(e.g. NP-hard) at the computation resources available to the
adversary. Orsdemir et al. [17] investigated the security and
robustness of employing a secret sensing matrix. They eval-
uated the security against brute force and structured attacks.
The analyses indicate that the computational complexity of
these attacks renders them infeasible in practice. In addition,
this SCS method was found to have fair robustness against
additive noise, making it a promising encryption technique for
multimedia applications. Hossein et al. [18] also addressed the
perfect secrecy problem for the scenario that the measurement
matrix as a key is known to both the sender and the receiver.
Similar results have been obtained, as reported in [16]. It is
shown that the Shannon perfect secrecy is, in general, not
achievable by such a SCS method while a weaker sense of
perfect secrecy may be achieved under certain conditions.
Agrawal and Vishwanath [19] employed the CS framework to
establish secure physical layer communication over a Wyner
wiretap channel. They showed that CS can exploit channel
asymmetry so that a message that is encoded as a sparse
vector is decodable with high probability at the receiver while
it is impossible to decode it with high probability by the
eavesdropper. Dautov and Tsouri [20] proposed an encryption
scheme where the sensing matrix is established using wireless
physical layer security and linear feedback shift register with
the corresponding m-sequences. It is shown that by using a
Rician fading channel, the proposed scheme generates valid
CS matrices while preventing access from an eavesdropper in
close proximity to one of the legitimate participants.
B. Our Contributions
We will present two main contributions in this paper.
On one hand, the CS-based encryption works [16–20], only
investigated SCS for the case that the measurement or sensing
matrix serves as a key and the corresponding security is
briefly evaluated. They have done a preliminary exploration
on SCS but did not provide concrete and operable encipher
models. Along this direction, we are going to investigate
SCS in a systematic manner. The relationship between CS
and symmetric cryptographic schemes indicates some possible
encryption approaches. To this end, we propose the two-level
protection models (TLPM) for SCS from two aspects of CS
which are developed on measurements taking and “something
else”, respectively, as summarized in Table I.
On the other hand, as discussed previously, the schemes
embedding encryption in compression algorithms based on
entropy coding or chaos theory suffer from the following
drawbacks:
a. Low compression performance. Entropy coding based
encryption always sacrifices the compression performance of
entropy coding [3–6, 9, 10] or at most maintains the same
level of compression performance [1, 2].
b. Low robustness. The schemes [1–6, 9, 10] are too fragile
to be applied in a noisy channel.
Specifically, we propose a SCS scheme embedding en-
cryption in parallel compressed sensing (PCS) by chaos to
overcome the above drawbacks. Our idea is inspired by two
techniques [28, 29]: embed permutation in PCS and generate
the measurement matrix by a tent map, respectively. The
proposed scheme incorporates a two-layer protection into PCS
under the control of chaos. The first layer is due to the random
permutation on a two-dimensional (2D) sparse signal while the
other samples the permuted signal column by column by using
the same measurement matrix. Both the random permutation
order and the measurement matrix are generated by a skew
tent map. Our approach has the following superiorities:
a. Embedding random permutation based encryption en-
hances the compression performance.
b. The proposed approach possesses high transmission ro-
bustness against noise.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section introduces TLPM. In Section III, we review two
recent techniques including embedding permutation in PCS
and designing the measurement matrix by a tent map. By
making use of these two techniques, a SCS scheme embedding
a two-layer protection in PCS by chaos is proposed in Section
IV, followed by simulation results in Section V and security
analysis in Section VI. The last section concludes our work.
II. TWO-LEVEL PROTECTION MODELS
Suppose an M -dimensional signal f ∈ RM is expressed as
f =
∑M
i=1
xiψi = Ψx, (1)
which means that f could be sparsely represented in a certain
domain by the transform matrix Ψ := [ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψM ]
with each column vector ψi ∈ RM , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . We
can say that x is exactly k-sparse if there are at most k
non-zero coefficients in the Ψ domain. Instead of sampling
x directly, we take a small number of CS measurements.
Let Φ := [ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕM ] denote a K × M matrix with
K ≪ M . Then K non-adaptive linear samples y can be
obtained by
y = Φf . (2)
The resultant CS measurements y are used for the recovery of
the original signal by solving the following convex optimiza-
tion problem
min ‖x‖1 s.t. y = ΦΨx (3)
(or in noisy situation : ‖ΦΨx − y‖2 ≤ ε)
to obtain f˜ = Ψx.
3TABLE I
ENCIPHER MODELS OF SCS.
Two aspects of CS Encipher models and relevant references
1st-level: Measurements taking Random projection [22]
Deterministic construction [23]
Structurally random matrices [24]
Multiclass encryption [25]
2nd-level: “Something else” Directional DCT during CS-based image coding [26]
Side information in distributed CS [27]
Permutation applied to parallel CS [28]
... ...
Fig. 1. The relationship between CS and symmetric-key cipher.
The basic model for CS is shown in the upper half of Fig.
1, which includes two major aspects: measurements taking
and signal recovery. From the perspective of symmetric-key
cipher, measurements taking involves an encryption algorithm
and signal recovery is associated with a decryption algorithm.
The relationship between CS and symmetric cryptography
indicates that some possible cryptographic features can be
embedded in CS. To this end, we propose TLPM for SCS
which are developed on measurements taking and “something
else”, respectively.
A. 1st-level Protection
One of the central problems in CS framework is the
selection of a proper measurement matrix Φ satisfying the
Restricted Isometry Property (RIP).
Definition 1: [30] Matrix Φ satisfies the Restricted Isometry
Property of order s if there exists a constant δs ∈ [0, 1] such
that
(1− δs) ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Φx‖22 ≤ (1 + δs) ‖x‖22 (4)
for all s-sparse signals x .
Cande`s and Tao [15] proposed that a matrix following
the Gaussian or Bernoulli distribution satisfies RIP with
overwhelming probability at sparsity s ≤ O (K/logM).
The randomly selected Fourier basis also retains RIP with
overwhelming probability, provided that the sparsity s ≤
O
(
K
/
(logM)
6
)
. In [15], it has been suggested that the
sensing matrix can be used as an encryption key such that
the CS framework leads to an encryption scheme.
Do et al. [24] proposed a framework called structurally
random matrix (SRM), defined as
Φ =
√
K
M
DFR, (5)
where R ∈ RM×M is either a uniform random permutation
matrix or a diagonal random matrix whose diagonal entries Rii
are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with identical distribution
P (Rii = ±1) = 12 . F ∈ RM×M is an orthonormal matrix
which is selected among popular fast computable transforms
like DCT and D ∈ RK×M represents a subsampling operator
which selects a random subset of rows in the matrix FR. The
scalar coefficient
√
K
M
is chosen to normalize the transform
so as to ensure that the energy of the measurement vector is
almost close to that of the input signal. This SRM can serve
as a secret due to the fact that the random permutation matrix
R is a common technique in classic encryption schemes.
Recently, Cambareri et al. [25] designed a novel multiclass
encryption scheme based on perturbing the measurement ma-
trix. The transmitter distributes the same encoded measure-
ments to receivers with different privileges so that they are
able to resconstruct the signal at various quality levels. Take
the two-class situation as an example, the relationship between
the two measurement matrices is formulated as
Φ(1) = Φ(0) +∆Φ, (6)
where ∆Φ is an c-sparse perturbation matrix of entries
∆Φi,j =
{
0, (i, j) /∈ C(0)
−2∆Φi,j, (i, j) ∈ C(0) (7)
where C(0) is a subset of c < KM entries chosen at random
for each Φ(0) with density c/KM . A first-class user knowing
the complete sampling matrix Φ(1) is able to exactly recover
4while a second-class user only having the knowledge of Φ(0)
is instead subject to an equivalent non-white noise term ε =
∆Φx because of the true sampling y = Φ(1)x.
Li et al. [23] introduced a deterministic construction of
sensing matrix via algebraic curves over finite fields, which
is a natural generalization of DeVore’s construction [31] using
polynomials over finite fields. The diversity of algebraic curves
provides numerous choices for the sensing matrices, i.e.,
more choices of key in the encryption scheme, which may
be valuable for the potential use of the sensing matrix for
cryptographic purpose. Besides, it has been investigated that
chaotic sequences can be employed to construct the sensing
matrix [22, 29], which will be further discussed in Section III
and used in the proposed encryption scheme in Section IV.
B. 2nd-level Protection
Apart from the above encryption mode on measurement
taking, in each practical application of CS, some other cryp-
tographic measures can be incorporated into other aspects that
we term “something else” according to the specific situation.
Take CS-based image coding [27] as an example. Deng
et al. [27] proposed an alternative image coding paradigm
with a number of descriptions based upon CS for high packet
loss transmission. After a 2D DWT is applied for sparse
representation, DWT coefficients are re-sampled towards equal
importance of information instead. At the decoder side, two
different CS recovery algorithms are developed for the low-
frequency and the high-frequency subbands, respectively, by
fully exploiting the intra-scale and inter-scale correlation of
multiscale DWT. Experimental results showed this CS-based
image codec is much more robust in lossy channels. Dur-
ing the recovery of scaling coefficients, spatial Gabor filters
with different frequencies and orientations [26] are utilized
to extract the dominant orientation of structures in each
block. The Gabor filter kernels with eight directions: j · pi/8,
j = 0, 1, · · · , 7, are used to output a response with respective
to the filter kernel for each scaling coefficient. The largest
response value is selected as the representative orientation
corresponding to one of the eight intra predictors, which is
sent to the decoder as side information. Such side information
can serve as a key. Side information is commonly used in
distributed coding [32–34] and its role as a key has been
discussed in [35–37]. This is an interesting research branch on
compressing encrypted data, which may lead to a new research
direction of compressing encrypted data in distributed CS [38].
Fang et al. [28] relaxed the RIP for 2D sparse signals by
permutation in PCS, in which the 2D signal is sampled column
by column using the same sensing matrix. In particular, the
zigzag-scan permutation as a so-called acceptable permutation
is applied to the 2D signal, the corresponding sensing matrix
has a smaller required order of RIP condition; therefore,
storage and computation requirements are further reduced.
This idea of permutation inspires us whether the zigzag-
scan permutation extended to random permutation can provide
cryptographic features in PCS. This topic will be discussed in
the following two sections.
III. TWO TECHNIQUES
The background of TLPM has been given in the previous
section. In the following sections, an encryption scheme for
PCS will be designed by applying two techniques, random
permutation and chaotic measurement matrix, in the 2nd-level
and 1st-level protection models, respectively.
A. Embedding Random Permutation in Parallel Compressive
Sensing
Traditionally, a multidimensional signal needs to be re-
shaped into an 1D signal prior to sampling using CS. Never-
theless, such a transformation makes the required size of the
sensing matrix dramatically large and increases the storage and
computational complexity significantly. To solve this problem,
Fang et al. proposed a novel solution [28], referred to as paral-
lel compressed sensing, which reshapes the multidimensional
signal into a 2D signal and samples the latter column by
column with the same sensing matrix. Moreover, a so-called
acceptable permutation can effectively relax the RIP for PCS.
Definition 2: [28] For a 2D sparse signal X with sparsity
vector s = [s1, s2, · · · , sN ] satisfying ‖s‖1 = s, where sj
is the sparsity level of the j-th column of X, a permutation
P(•) is called acceptable for X if the Chebyshev norm of the
sparsity vector of P (X) is smaller than ‖s‖∞ of X.
When a 2D s-sparse signal is exactly reconstructed by using
PCS, a sufficient condition is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1: [28] Consider a 2D s-sparse signal X, if the
RIP of order ‖s‖∞ holds for the sensing matrix Φ, i.e.,
δ2‖s‖∞ <
√
2− 1, then X can be exactly reconstructed using
PCS scheme.
This lemma implies that with respect to PCS, the RIP
requirement of the sensing matrix Φ at a given reconstruction
quality is related to ‖s‖∞. A zigzag-scan permutation is
considered acceptable in relaxing the RIP condition before
using the PCS [28], but it is tailored to the sparse signal
following a layer model. We generalize the permutation for the
2D sparse signal whose distribution is unknown in advance.
Assume that P(•) is a random permutation operation, then
X∗ = P (X), where X∗ ∈ RM×N is a permuted 2D signal
with sparsity vector s∗. Observing the relationship between
random and acceptable permutations, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: For a 2D sparse signalX, if the distribution of the
sparsity level in each column is not sufficiently uniform, then
the random permutation P(•) is an acceptable permutation
with overwhelming probability
P {P (•) is acceptable} .= 1− 1
N ⌈s/N⌉
. (8)
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
B. Chaotic Measurement Matrix
For a random sensing matrix, its storage and transmission
require a lot of space and energy. Thus, it is preferable to gen-
erate and handle the sensing matrix by one or more seed keys
only. Yu et al. [22] proposed to construct the sensing matrix
using chaotic sequence in a trivial manner and proved that the
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Fig. 2. A schematic diagram of the proposed approach.
RIP of this kind of matrix is guaranteed with overwhelming
probability, providing that the sparsity s ≤ O (K/log (M/s)).
They generated a sampled Logistic sequence X (d, l, z0),
which has been regularized, with sampling distance d, length
l = K×M and initial condition z0. Then a matrix Φ is created
from this sequence column by column, denoted as
Φ =
√
2
K


z0 zK · · · zK(M−1)
z1 zK+1 · · · zK(M−1)+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
zK−1 z2K−1 · · · zKM−1

 (9)
where the scalar
√
2/K is for normalization purpose. One can
take the initial condition z0 as a key, since different sensing
matrices are obtained from different initial conditions. The
adoption of chaos can further enhance the security due to
its pseudo-random behavior and high sensitivity to the initial
condition.
Frunzete et al. [29] further constructed chaotic measurement
matrix by introducing the one-dimensional skew tent map
given by
z (k + 1) = T [z (k) ;µ] =
{
z(k)
µ
, if 0 < z (k) < µ
1−z(k)
1−µ , if µ ≤ z (k) < 1(10)
where the control parameter µ ∈ (0, 1) and the initial state
z (0) ∈ (0, 1). In terms of RIP, Frunzete et. al. [29] proved
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: [29] A chaotic sequence Φ ∈ RK×M con-
structed by the skew tent map satisfies RIP for constant
δs > 0 with overwhelming probability providing that s ≤
O (K/log (M/s)).
For PCS, we can immediately infer the result described
below.
Corollary 1: If the sensing matrix Φ ∈ RK×M is constructed
by a chaotic sequence with
K ≥ C · ‖s‖∞ log (M/‖s‖∞) (11)
for some constant C, then it will satisfy the RIP of order ‖s‖∞
with overwhelming probability.
Unlike the Logistic map, the probability density function
of skew tent map follows the uniform distribution, which
is more immune against statistical attacks in cryptographic
applications. As a result, the skew tent map is chosen in the
permutation operation and the construction of the measure-
ment matrix.
IV. EMBEDDING BI-LAYER ENCRYPTION IN PARALLEL
COMPRESSED SENSING USING CHAOS
A block diagram of our approach is depicted in Fig. 2.
Compressive sensing and encryption are performed simulta-
neously under the control of chaos. The encoding process
is mainly comprised of two steps, permutation and measure-
ment. A 2D signal X ∈ RM×N is firstly reshaped into
1D signal {x (i)}MNi=1 , which is then permuted in accordance
with {Index (i)}MNi=1 described below. The permuted signal
{x∗ (i)}MNi=1 is converted back to the 2D format X∗ ∈ RM×N .
After the permutation, the signal X∗ is sampled column by
column using the same measurement matrix Φ, i.e., Y∗ [j] =
ΦX∗ [j], where Y∗ ∈ RK×N and X∗ [j] represents the jth
column of X∗. In the decoding phase, Xˆ∗ can be recovered
from the received Yˆ∗ and is then processed by the reverse
permutation to derive the signal Xˆ of interest, as shown in
Fig. 2. The whole process is controlled by chaos, specifically,
the skew tent map with four keys, µ, z (0), µ′ and z′ (0).
A. Generating the Permutation Order
There are a number of classic methods in realizing the
permutation operation P(•) from one or more keys using
chaos, some of which are stated as follows:
Straightforward transform. Use 2D chaotic transforms such
as Arnold map to directly project the indices of the 2D signal,
e.g., [39].
Matrix rotation. Employ the chaotic sequence to construct
the rotation matrix acting on 1D signal, e.g., [40].
Indices sorting. Sort the chaotic sequence to generate the
index matrix, applying to the indices of the 1D signal, e.g.,
[41].
Here, we apply the method “indices sorting” to perform
the permutation. According to [41], a permutation sequence is
produced by using the skew tent map by the following steps:
a. Set the keys µ and z (0) to iterate the skew tent map
MN +m times, then discard the first m values to get rid of
the transient effect.
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Fig. 3. Four encoded images at different CRs. (a) CR = 0.8; (b) CR = 0.6; (c) CR = 0.4; (d) CR = 0.2.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4. Four decoded images corresponding to the four encoded images in Fig. 3 for different CRs. (a) CR = 0.8; (b) CR = 0.6; (c) CR = 0.4; (d)
CR = 0.2.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5. The test of key sensitivity (CR = 0.2). (a) z (0) = 0.33 + 10−16 ; (b) µ = 0.63 + 10−16 ; (c) z′ (0) = 0.73 + 10−16 ; (d) µ′ = 0.28 + 10−16 .
b. Sort the remaining MN values {z (i)}m+MNi=m+1 to obtain
{z¯ (i)}m+MNi=m+1 .
c. Search the values of {z (i)}m+MNi=m+1 in {z¯ (i)}m+MNi=m+1 , and
store the corresponding indices {Index (i)}MNi=1 .
Apparently, {Index (i)}MNi=1 indicates an order of the in-
tegers from 1 to MN . The above steps have been widely
used to generate the permutation order in image encryption
schemes. However, the complexity O (n2 logn) is high. A
novel algorithm, whose complexity is reduced to O (n logn),
was designed in [42]. The procedures are:
a. Initialize a flag sequence {flag (k)}MNk=1 and a permuta-
tion sequence {Index (k)}MNk=1 to 0 and set i = 1, j = 1.
b. Calculate z (k + 1) = T [z (k) ;µ] and χ =
⌈MN × z (k + 1)⌉.
c. If flag (χ) = 0, then set Index (i) = χ, flag (χ) = 1
and i = i+ 1; otherwise, let j = j + 1 and go to Step b.
d. If i < MN , set j = j + 1 and go to Step b.
B. Generating the Measurement Matrix
Following the idea of [29], the chaotic measurement matrix
is constructed by the following steps:
a. Define the chaotic sequence ∆(d, k, µ′, z′ (0)) :=
{z′ (n+ i× d)}ki=0, which is extracted from the chaotic se-
quence generated by the skew tent map with sampling distance
d and keys µ′ and z′ (0).
b. Introduce a new transform {ϑ (k)}KM−1k=0 =
{−2×∆(d, k, µ′, z′ (0)) + 1}|k=KM−1.
c. Create the measurement matrix column by column using
the sequence {ϑ (k)}KM−1k=0 , as given by
Φ =
√
2
K


ϑ (0) · · · ϑ (KM −K)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ϑ (K − 1) . . . ϑ (KM − 1)

 (12)
where the scalar
√
2/K is used for normalization.
7V. SIMULATION
An image can be considered as a 2D signal, which is
sparsified by 2D discrete cosine transform (DCT2) to obtain a
2D sparse signal X. The best s-term approximation is acquired
by keeping the s largest DCT2 coefficients and setting the
remaining to zeros. Four images of size 512×512, Peppers,
Lena, Boat and Baboon, are used in the simulations. The basis
pursuit algorithm in the CVX optimization toolbox [43] is
employed to realize the PCS reconstruction. Apart from the
basis pursuit, other reconstruction algorithms can also be used.
The reconstruction performance is evaluated by peak signal-
to-noise ratio (PSNR). Four session keys µ, z (0), µ′ and z′ (0)
are chosen from (0, 1), satisfying µ 6= z (0) and µ′ 6= z′ (0).
With respect to the construction of the measurement matrix,
the sampling distance is chosen as d = 15 according to [29].
A. Compressibility
The encoded (or encrypted) image can have various sizes
depending on the compression ratio (CR), i.e., the ratio of
the number of measurements to the total number of entries
in the DCT2 coefficient matrix. Figure 3 shows four encoded
images for the original Peppers image corresponding to CR =
0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 with given key values µ = 0.63, z (0) = 0.33,
µ′ = 0.28 and z′ (0) = 0.73. In order to investigate the
effect of encryption on CR, we plot PSNR versus CR for
different images with/without encryption in Fig. 6, where
“E” represents encryption while “N” means no encryption.
No encryption refers to the case that a 2D sparse signal is
sampled column by column with the same measurement matrix
drawn from Gaussian ensembles, which are replaced by the
chaotic sequences in our experiment. As observed from Fig.
6, encryption helps to improve the PSNR of all images by
around 2∼6 dB at the same CR. In other words, at the same
PSNR, encryption makes CR smaller. In comparison with the
general joint compression and encryption schemes in which
encryption always compromises the compression performance,
the proposed approach embedding encryption in PCS reduces
CR, while maintains the same reconstruction quality. This is
mainly due to the fact that random permutation can relax the
RIP for 2D sparse signals with high probability in PCS, as
justified by Theorem 1.
B. Robustness
Introducing encryption into PCS makes it still possess
high reconstruction robustness, even for a small amount of
encoded data. This can be visually verified by the four decoded
images, as shown in Fig. 4. The decoded (or decrypted)
images contain most of the visual information of the original
images, even at CR = 0.2. A significant requirement in the
transmission process is the robustness of a coding system (or
cryptosystem) against imperfection such as additive Gaussian
while noise (AGWN) and cropping attack (CA). These two
capabilities are quantified in Table II for the Peppers image.
In particular, the encoded images at different CRs are affected
by these imperfections and the PSNRs of the corresponding
decoded images are calculated. Additive Gaussian while noise
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Fig. 6. PSNR versus CR for different images with/without encryption.
TABLE II
PSNR OF DIFFERENT SETTINGS AT VARIOUS CRS.
CR 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
PCS-N(=Γ1) 20.0800 25.2575 29.4243 34.0949
PCS-E(=Γ2) 25.7507 30.0071 33.4539 37.7431
Γ2 − Γ1 5.6707 4.7496 4.0296 3.6482
PCS-AGWN-N(=Γ3) 20.0899 25.2382 29.3072 33.0931
PCS-AGWN-E(=Γ4) 25.7405 29.9143 33.0547 35.8942
Γ4 − Γ3 5.6506 4.6761 3.7475 2.8011
PCS-CA-N(=Γ5) 13.7827 13.2879 11.8456 9.0193
PCS-CA-E(=Γ6) 16.1730 15.9257 13.7208 9.5178
Γ6 − Γ5 2.3903 2.6378 1.8752 0.4985
yields zero-mean normal distribution with variance 1 while
the cropping attack cuts one-eighth of the encoded image at
the upper left corner. Observing Γ3 and Γ4, or Γ5 and Γ6
from Table II, we can see that at a channel with both AGWN
and CA, encryption improves the PSNR at the same CR.
By individually comparing the variation trends of Γ2 − Γ1,
Γ4−Γ3 and Γ6−Γ5, the tendency is that the smaller the CR,
the greater the improvement. In addition, vertically contrasting
these three rows of data reveals that PSNE improvements are
similar with and without AGWN. With respect to CA, the
improvement is reduced. Thus, we come to the conclusion that
the proposed approach possesses a stronger robustness against
AGWN than CA. It is worth mentioning that similar results
are obtained using other images.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the security of the pro-
posed scheme embedding bi-layer encryption in PCS using
chaos. Assume that Alice sends an encrypted message Y∗ =
ΦP (X) = ΦX∗ to Bob, who decrypts the message by solving
the following convex optimization problem
min ‖X∗ [j]‖1 s.t. Y∗ [j] = ΦX∗ [j] , j ∈ [1, N ] (13)
and so X = P−1 (X∗). An eavesdropper, Eve, attempts to
recover the plaintext X or the encryption keys Φ and P(•)
determined by the initial values of the chaotic system after
intercepting the ciphertext Y∗.
8A. Asymptotic Spherical Secrecy
Considering Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy that the
probability of a message conditioned on the cryptogram is
equal to the a priori probability of the message, the proposed
scheme does not achieve perfect secrecy, as stated in Lemma
3.
Lemma 3: Let X be a random varible, whose probability is
PX (X) > 0, ∀X ∈ RM×N , and Φ be a K×M measurement
matrix. With respect to the encryption model Y = ΦP(X),
we have I (X ;Y ) > 0, and so perfect secrecy is not achieved.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
By the RIP, Y provides information about the norm of
X. The fact that the l2-norm of a vector can be considered
as its energy has been utilized by Cambareri et al. [25] in
introducing the notion of asymptotic spherical secrecy for CS
encoding in which the measurement matrix serves as a key.
Definition 3: [25] (asymptotic spherical secrecy). Let x(n) =
(x0, x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Rn be a plaintext sequence of increasing
length n and y(n) be the corresponding ciphertext sequence.
Assume that the power of the plaintext is positive and finite,
i.e.,
Wx = lim
n→∞
1
n
∑n
k=1
x2k, 0 < Wx < +∞. (14)
A cryptosytem is said to have asymptotic spherical secrecy
if
fY (n)|X(n) (y,x)→
D
fY (n)|Wx (y) , (15)
where →
D
denotes the convergence in distribution as n→∞.
This definition implies that it is impossible for Eve to infer
the plaintext x but its power from the statistical properties of
the random measurements y. Although not achieving perfect
secrecy, the proposed scheme satisfies asymptotic spherical
secrecy.
Theorem 3: (asymptotic spherical secrecy of the proposed
scheme)
Let
1) X(n) = (Xij) ∈ RM×N be a bounded-value plain-
text with power 0 < WX < +∞, defined as WX =
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1X
2
ij , where n =MN ;
2) X∗(n) = P (X(n)) = (X∗ij) ∈ RM×N with power
WX∗ = lim
n→∞
1
n
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1
(
X∗ij
)2
;
3) Y(n) = (Yij) ∈ RK×M be the corresponding ciphertext,
where Yij =
∑M
k=1 ΦikX
∗
kj . As n→∞, we have
Yij→
D
N (0,MWX/K) . (16)
The derivation of this result can be found in Appendix C.
B. Computational Secrecy
Cryptosystems relying on computation-secrecy such as RSA
are practical and widely used. In contrast to information theo-
retic secrecy which is an ideal encryption requirement, compu-
tational secrecy allows the ciphertext contains the complete or
partial plaintext information, which is common. This ensures
that for Eve to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext without
the correct keys is equivalent to solving a computational prob-
lem that is assumed to be extremely difficult (e.g., NP-hard). In
the proposed scheme, X is a 2D sparse signal with sparsity s.
If a wrong key µ, z (0), µ′ or z′ (0), which is almost identical
to the correct key, is used by Eve in attempting to recover X,
the result is unsuccessful due to the high key sensitivity. To test
the sensitivity of the four keys, a tiny perturbation of 10−16
is added, respectively, and the decoded images are depicted
in Fig. 5. Their indistinguishability justifies the high key
sensitivity of the proposed approach. In fact, this is guaranteed
by the inherent property of chaos, i.e., high sensitivity to
initial conditions. The key space is at least 264. Moreover,
the unsuccessful recovery of the signal using a wrong key can
also be justified by the following theorem.
Theorem 4: [16] Let Φ and Φ˜ be K×M matrices with entries
generated by different keys. Let x be s-sparse and y = Φx.
When s˜ ≥ s+ 1, the l0 or l1 optimization used will yield an
s˜-sparse solution with probability one.
On the contrary, once an s-sparse solution is obtained
using some keys, Eve easily realizes that it must be the
correct key. Computational secrecy can be achieved if Eve
is computationally bounded; otherwise, the cryptanalysis will
succeed. However, in practical applications, the keys should
be at least 264 bits and are updated periodically to resist brute-
force attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper is firstly dedicated to the design of TLPM for
SCS. Some connections between CS and symmetric-key cipher
are analyzed. Some cryptographic features are embedded in
CS, as summarized in Table I. We hope the connections
between CS and symmetric-key cipher will lead to a new
point of view and stimulate further research in both areas. In
the second part of this paper, an encryption scheme for PCS
has been proposed. Simulations using images as 2D signals
show that at the same compression ratio, encryption improves
the PSNR by 2∼6 dB for all images. For a channel suffered
from both additive Gaussian white noise and cropping attack,
encryption still improves the PSNR when the compression
ratio is fixed. It is found that the proposed approach possesses
a higher robustness against additive Gaussian white noise
than cropping attack. The encryption also possesses high key
sensitivity and security. In our further work, we will further
explore and design some other SCS schemes by virtue of
TLPM.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: If ‖s∗‖∞ ≤ ‖s‖∞, i.e., Pr {P(•) is acceptable} = 0,
meaning that each column of X tends to have similar sparsity
levels, P(•) does not work. However, such an X has relaxed
the RIP condition for PCS without permutation. Thus, we
consider the X where the distribution of the sparsity level
in each column is not sufficiently uniform, which, more
importantly, accords with the feature of a nature signal. Each
element in X will be randomly located at any index of X∗,
9that is, this transition of all the indices fromX to X∗ yields the
uniform distribution. Each non-zero element of X appears in
each column ofX∗ with equal probability 1
N
. This has a strong
resemblance to the classical probability problem of s balls and
N boxes. The probability that the random permutation P(•)
is an acceptable permutation is calculated as
P {P (•) is acceptable} = P {‖s∗‖∞ < ‖s‖∞}
= 1− P {‖s∗‖∞ ≥ ‖s‖∞} = 1−
∑N
k=‖s‖∞
P {‖s∗‖∞ = k}
= 1−∑Nk=‖s‖∞ C1NNk = 1− NN−1 • 1N‖s‖∞ • NN+1−‖s‖∞−1NN+1−‖s‖∞
= 1− NN+1−‖s‖∞−1
(N−1)NN
≥ 1− NN+1−⌈s/N⌉−1
(N−1)NN.
= 1− 1
N⌈s/N⌉
.
(17)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. Apparently,
I (X ;Y ) > 0 if and only if X and Y are statistically
independent. In the context of X = 0, Y = ΦP(X) =
ΦP(0) = Φ · 0 = 0 and thus PY |X (Y = 0|X = 0) = 1.
On the other hand, only X in the null space of Φ¯ which
is a new transform Φ¯ = ΦP(•) are mapped to Y = 0;
whereas, we have PY (Y = 0) < 1 due to the assumption
that PX (X) > 0, ∀X ∈ RM×N . As a result, we conclude
that PY |X (Y = 0|X = 0) 6= PY (Y = 0), meaning that X
and Y are statistically dependent.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Permutation does not affect the power and thus
WX∗ = WX. After the random permutation, the energy is
approximately uniformly dispersed to each column of X∗(n).
In other words, the power of each column converges to that
for the whole plaintext in distribution, i.e.,
1
M
∑M
k=1
(
X∗ij
)2→
D
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1
(
X∗ij
)2
= lim
n→∞
1
n
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1X
2
ij =WX.
(18)
The measurement matrix Φ is sub-Gaussican with i.i.d. ele-
ments [29]. We calculate
E
[
Y 2ij
]
= E
[(∑M
k=1 ΦikX
∗
kj
)2]
= 1
K
∑M
k=1
(
X∗kj
)2→
D
M
K
WX.
(19)
thereby yielding the result stated in Theorem 3.
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